Indian air farce

Recently, the helicopter formation carrying the President of India had a narrow escape in Mumbai. The force which prides in flying fighter aircraft at speeds close to or greater than Mach 2, has given a feeling similar to the “Mach 3 turbo” that a man on terra firma is used to. The close shave that the occupants of the first helicopter and the passengers on board the Air India flight had is something to thank the Gods for.
The airline officials went to town making a hero of the pilot of the aircraft who rejected the take off when instructed by the control tower. The Air Chief Marshall insists that his helicopter pilots are among the best and they did everything right. Meanwhile, the two Air traffic controllers are “De-rostered”, which means they can’t function in the seats they were in at the time of the incident. This incident is going to be a watershed in Indian aviation. Are we going to be a force or are we going to be a farce?
A few days after the incident at Mumbai, there was a near miss over the Jorhat airspace in the Northeast. An IL-76 aircraft descended to a lower altitude triggering what is called a “Resolution Alert” on the on-board TCAS (Traffic Collision and Avoidance System). The Air India flight from Dibrugarh to Guwahati responded immediately to the TCAS commands and a collision was avoided. The IAF, promptly, came back and said that the aircraft belonged to the ARC (belonging to the Intelligence Bureau) and not the Air Force. The fault was with the Jorhat ATC, which belongs to the IAF and who gave clearance without coordinating with Dibrugarh or Guwahati Air Traffic control. A disaster was averted.
Ian Fleming, who created James Bond, gave 007 the license to kill. That freedom is acceptable in fiction. The IAF owns the sky in times of war but, one cannot grant them the same privilege during the time of peace. Their attitude, and reluctance to learn from errors of omissions and commissions, is going to create major problems for aviation in India. The incident at Mumbai is being investigated by the Director General of Civil Aviation. But, as the protocol of the Air Force keeps their personnel protected from civilian intrusion, the pilots of the helicopters will not appear before the civilian investigation board. The IAF will conduct its own investigation and give out a report. When the top man has already given his judgment that his men are in the clear, will any subordinate officer think otherwise? Can two agencies who cannot communicate find neutral ground for justice?
Modern technology has given us a wonderful safety device called TCAS. This equipment saved the mid-air collision situation near Jorhat. The Air India aircraft that was involved in the Mumbai incident had the TCAS “ON”. If the Air force helicopter too had the transponders “ON”, the Air India aircraft would have received a “TRAFFIC ALERT”. This comes both as a visual and aural warning in the cockpit. Even without the ATC controller alerting the pilots, they would have been aware of the traffic in and around the airport. The returns from the onboard computers connected with the TCAS equipment is specially designed for that. The major question is: “Why were the VVIP helicopters flying the President of India into a major airport, flying without the transponders ON?” If the transponders were ON, the Approach Control radar would have known the exact position of the aircraft, both in the vertical as well as the horizontal plane. This is a major safety and security lapse.
The helicopters were coming in from the Naval station which is located on a magnetic bearing of 178 degrees (slightly east of south to the airport). The procedure for their arrival should have been from the south up to a point which is three nautical miles (five km), head towards a point which is east of the beginning of Runway 27 which was in use, and then make the final approach on a westerly direction (271 degrees). The definition of final approach is clearly mentioned in ICAO Doc.4444 and is the reciprocal direction of the runway extending from the threshold of the runway. For the VVIP helicopters, which had asked for the “Landing position” and to which the ATC had given the “Most likely position between R and W”, the two taxiways marked “R” and “W”, the centre line would have been the reciprocal line from those intersections. Aircraft are given the parking stands, while in the air. That does not convert to landing clearance.

ICAO procedures have also clearly stated that the “Active Runway” is under the control of the Control Tower. One needs specific clearance from the control tower, to use the runway — whether for take-off, landing, taxiing or crossing. An example is the procedure in Delhi airport. When an aircraft lands on the new runway 29, the aircraft is transferred to the ground control for taxiing.
In aviation, the golden rule for safe operation is “Aviate, Navigate. Communicate and Manage”. The helicopters that operated the VVIP flight on that particular day had forgotten this golden rule. They should have flown the flight as per their flight plan. The flight plan was for three Mi 8 Helicopters. What operated were two Mi 8s and one Mi 172 (which belongs to the transport squadron and not to the VVIP squadron). The team leader had informed the Radar controller that their estimate time of arrival was 09:20 a.m. and the door opening time of 09:25AM. Protocol for VVIP flights strictly adhere to these timings.

The first helicopter came in formation up to the three mile point. There after, it appears to have deviated to the left and approached the airport in a bearing of 210 degrees (from the southwest). The aircraft did not follow the laid down procedure of approaching from the east for landing. The time was approaching 09:17 a.m.! A good three minutes ahead of the estimated time given by the team leader. This is very poor navigation considering the total distance of the flight was just 10 miles and an error of three minutes on such a miniscule flight is appalling.
“Aviate” requires that you observe what is happening around you. The direction from which the helicopter was approaching the runway would have given a clear view of the Air India airbus on the take off run. The helicopter could have stopped moving at any point in the sky. Instead, he kept approaching for landing, without contacting the control tower, without obtaining the mandatory landing clearance and without conforming to the procedures. If this is what the “Best” in the business can deliver, God help us.
The real hero of the situation was the man on duty at the control tower. After clearing the Airbus for take-off, it is but natural for the officer’s vision to follow the aircraft until it is safely airborne. He has demonstrated exemplary initiative in observing a helicopter intruding from a direction where it should never have been. The promptness with which the tower controller called for the Airbus to “Stop immediately” is something to be appreciated. Instead, our system takes an efficient officer off the line for enquiry! If this is not a farce, the English language has to be redefined. The controller called “Stop immediately, I say again Stop immediately,” twice, with a gap of nine seconds. For reasons best known, the captain rejected take off only after a gap of almost 16 seconds from the first call. It was fortunate that he did respond in time, albeit slow.
Do the powers-that-be who have been passing judgments even before the investigation is complete, realise how close the situation was to a major disaster? If the controller had not noticed the intruding aircraft and the captain had taken off, the flight path of the Airbus would have intercepted the helicopter approaching over the runway, almost in front of the terminal building.
The Mumbai incident as well the Jorhat incident have proved that there is a major deficiency in communication. The helicopters that were involved did not communicate with the control tower. The main helicopter with the President on board contacted the tower when just over the runway and landed without obtaining landing clearance. This happened a couple of minutes after the drama that took place earlier. They proceeded as though nothing had happened. This was poor management of the situation.
22/02/09 Capt. A. Ranganathan/The Hindu

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Categories: Air India Domestic Feb 2009, Airports Feb 2009, NACIL Feb 2009, Safety Feb 2009